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Amongst the great corpus of modern economic knowledge, a relatively small number of 
theorems are very important to understanding what makes the people in some countries 
rich and in others poor. Wisdom in economic affairs comes from understanding how these 
important propositions relate to the currents that shape national governance, the tides that 
rouse and tame human spirits, and the institutions that constrain and channel the energies 
of a community. 
Students are introduced to most of the important propositions in their historical, political, and 
institutional context in the work of Professor Edward Shann. Shann winds the economic 
truths through the exciting history of a new country. I hope that he is still read widely on his 
old campus. 
Shann's Economic History of Australia has much to say on the issues that beat upon our 
ears today: financial regulation; the origins and consequences of speculative boom; the 
moral basis of an effective market economy; the role of public enterprises in a mixed 
economy; and the political economy of protection. Following Marshall half a century before 
him, Shann even discussed ideas about protection for industries with economies of scale, 
which Boston economists relabled and recycled in the 1980s as "strategic trade theory". 
Shann thought and wrote that Australians would prosper most with open foreign trade. He 
was deeply sceptical about the contributions to prosperity of enterprises subject to public 
ownership and, therefore, in some sense and circumstances, to political control. With his 
main economic history published during the long high tide in Australian commitment to a 
large and interventionist state, he was dubbed a political conservative by many of his 
contemporaries and successors. 
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I do not believe that this is an accurate placement of Shann's published work in the 
excessively simple political spectrum that runs from libertarianism to social democracy, or 
/ 
from the left to the right of the political spectrum in this country. He was a conservative in 
the sense that he was wary of the enthusiastic departure from established and proven 
wisdom, in the way that any good student of history is wary of the practical men who think 
that here and now operates on its own rules, outside history. But in casting the eyes of 
economist and historian over the evolution of economic institutions in early Australia, he 
was as aware of the dangers of a weak, chaotic state, as of a state strong enough to 
enforce tyranny. In writing of the great clashes between capital and labour late last century 
that did so much to shape the Australia of the federation, no case is made against the 
labour cause. If there is morality as well as scientific history in his judgement, it is against 
the pragmatic man of capital, whose greed can in times of excitement and compliant 
government divert, capture, and destroy the growth of national wealth. 
Shann attributed most of the greatest threats to common prosperity not to any evil from a 
known spot on the conventional political spectrum, but to simpler flaws in the human frame, 
or to accident. In telling the great and terrible story of David Syme and Victorian 
protectionism, he recalls with approval Trevelyan's memorable description of nationalism as 
"that simplest of all ideals which has in its nature no political affinities either with liberty on 
the one hand, or with tyranny on the other; it can be turned by some chance current of 
events or by the cunning or clumsiness of statesmen to run in any channel and to work any 
wheel". 
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Re-reading Shann reminds us that economic analysis and historical insight together stand 
guard against the tides of nationalist enthusiasm. They stand guard as well against the 
sense of their infallibility that grows around the short-term success of practical men; against 
the importuning of weak government by self-interested wealth; and against the whim and 
chance of error. 
THE MARKET AND THE STATE 
From the birth of modern economics with Adam Smith's Wealth of Nations two centuries 
ago, debate has continued in the West about the appropriate roles of markets and state 
intervention in co-ordinating economic activity. We have learned a great deal in principle 
from the concepts of public goods and external economies, and from the theory of public 
finance which relies so heavily on them. We have also learned that much depends upon 
the institutions and the ideas that shape the effectiveness both of markets and the state. 
The economist and the historian have been provided with a rich new set of data on the big 
theorems by the success of the economies of East Asia in recent decades. Japan, Taiwan, 
South Korea, Hong Kong, and Singapore have expanded economic output faster for longer 
than any other in world history. The mainland of China between 1977 and 1989 
experienced similarly rapid economic growth. The evidence is accumulating that several 
economies in Southeast Asia - Thailand, Malaysia, and recently Indonesia - are also 
revealing high capacities for growth. 
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Such an historic shift in the world's economic centre of gravity from the distant North Atlantic 
to Australia's own region, involving countries whose resource endowments are highly 
complementary to our own, has immense implications for Australia, through the 
opportunities it offers for productive exchange. 
In this paper, I focus on a different type of implication - the implication of this new and 
powerful case of economic development for our understanding of economic processes. To 
the economist whose discipline is a social science, the emergence of this new case in a 
different cultural and institutional setting is as great a gift as a new hemisphere to an 
astronomer. 
I have been encouraged to this subject by some of the public discussion of my recent report 
to the Australian Prime Minister and Foreign Minister - Australia and the Northeast Asian 
Ascendancy. In that Report, after analysing the postwar growth performance of Northeast 
Asian economies, I noted that Australia could perform better economically if it increased the 
international orientation of Australian production, raised savings and investment, including 
through investment in education, and embraced rapid structural change as an inevitable and 
necessary part of the process of growth. I noted the role of protection and other state 
intervention in some of the Northeast Asian economies, but, out of deference for the 
ambiguities, drew no strong and general conclusions about their contributions to rapid 
growth. Some academic critics have found fault in this caution, asserting that pervasive 
state intervention in economic activity has been crucial to East Asian economic success, 
and that we should emulate East Asia at least in these respects. 
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The question of the role of the state in East Asian development has also been raised in the 
t 
discussion of policy. Practical men have called the protectionist mote in East Asian eyes to • 
the defence of the beam in our own. 
The concluding section of this paper addresses Australian policy discussion in the aftermath 
of my Report. But first, what do we learn about the ancient issue of markets versus the •;t; 
state from the recognition of East Asia as a second major locus of successful economic 
development? 
GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION IN EAST ASIA 
Milton Friedman in his Singapore Lecture ten years ago used the Singapore and Hong 
Kong successes to argue the case for economic libertarianism. "Singapore calls itself 
socialist", he said, "but much to the credit of its farsighted leaders, it has essentially followed 
capitalist principles. It has promoted a free market. That free market has enabled 
Singapore to thrive, despite extensive interventions of government." 
Friedman's Singapore Lecture was a bold and, in retrospect, somewhat prophetic statement 
about the turning of the world intellectual tide towards libertarian economic values, after 
several decades of what he described as collectivist ascendancy. Singapore had done well, 
he argued, because it had relied upon the free market, and Hong Kong better because it 
had rfilied mom on thfi market.  
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Other theologians of capitalism have not been so sure about the lessons that can be drawn 
about East Asia's success. Berger, for example, states as one of his fifty propositions about 
prosperity, liberty, and equality, that the East Asia evidence falsifies the idea that a high 
degree of state intervention in the economy is incompatible with successful capitalist 
development. 
One different and interesting attempt to bring the East Asian experience to account in 
answering the big questions of economics and economic history is the long-run historical 
work of Jones at LaTrobe University. In his recent book, Growth Recurring, Jones 
addresses perhaps the biggest issue in economic history. He looks back over a thousand 
years, and asks why Song China attained relatively high per capita productivity and 
incomes, without entering a period of sustained intensive economic growth as in Europe 
under modern capitalism. Song China was familiar with most of the inventions which had 
been thought to have been essential to the industrial revolution in Europe. Jones is led by 
the evidence to focus strongly on the role of government. Growth can occur, he concluded, 
only within an "optimality band", where "factor and commodity markets are freed and the 
government is neither too grasping nor too weak". These conditions came to exist in 
Europe a few centuries ago, but not in the Eurasian heartland, "where the main stumbling 
block was the centralised politic of conquest in its effect on incentives". 
Jones notes that the difference between the roles of government in the great empires of 
China, India, and the Ottoman, and in Europe under capitalism, was not simply that 
government was larger and more intrusive in Asia. 
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Every modern state in an advanced industrial economy has more control over the allocation 
of resources than any of the rambling despotisms of antiquity. Private agencies in Manchu 
China and Mughal India provided many infrastructural services to commerce that, in the age 
of capitalism, came to be made available by government in Europe. For growth to be 
sustained, government had to provide the institutions that were necessary to the effective 
operation of the market itself: enforcement of rights of property and contract; freedom of 
secure movement and exchange over large areas; the personal security that makes long-
term investment in education feasible and worthwhile; and much else. 
Scholars have drawn a similarly shaded and subtle picture of the sources of modern 
economic growth in East Asia. Krause notes the large presence of state-owned enterprises 
in Singapore production, and wonders why they seem to be more productive there than 
elsewhere. He notes the role of the high quality of recruitment into the public sector, and of 
a government-led ideology, built around commitment to economic development in a market 
context, that reduces the costs of enforcing market-conforming behaviour in public and 
private institutions. This suggests that the degree of reliance on government should depend 
on cultural and ideological circumstances in particular societies. 
The local Singaporean contributions to these discussions, including those of Lim Chong 
Yah and Associates, accept, in a matter of fact manner, that government has played a large 
role in Singapore success. In the event, it has been economically wise intervention, 
supporting and facilitating the structural changes that are being promoted by the 
international economy's interaction with Singapore through market forces. 
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Few interventions affecting prices have driven a wedge between incentives provided in 
international markets and those operating at home in Singapore. But while being frugal with 
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price-distorting intervention, government has been important to human capital formation, to 
the distributional equity upon which political stability within a market economy depends, and 
to the promotion of high rates of savings and investment. Strong and decisive government 
has helped to provide an environment in which markets can work effectively. 
Japan, like Singapore, has been used by both sides of the Western argument about the 
roles of state and market. Japan has, proportionately, by far the smallest public sector 
amongst industrial economies. It also has a highly competitive and, today, internationally 
open industrial sector. Some analysts see this as the key to economic success. Others, 
like Johnson in his influential definition of the "development state", have emphasised the 
strategic interventions in corporate decision-making of a powerful Ministry of International 
Trade and Industry. 
There is not much doubt about the role of markets in the prodigious growth performance of 
Hong Kong over these past four-and-a-half decades. The debate over Hong Kong's 
success has been about whether its role as the recipient of people and capital from 
communist China has made it a special and advantaged case or, as Friedman would have 
it, a victim of unfavourable circumstances that was able to absorb in its stride hordes of 
unskilled immigrants because it used so intensively the productive power of markets. 
w^itesaMwaMito^Mfi^^ 
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The pervasive government interventions of Stalinist central planning have failed as 
emphatically in East Asia as in Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union, and Cuba. It took some 
decades for China to face this reality. Vietnam, diverted by military goals, took longer. 
North Korea has not yet done so. 
The explosion of growth in the Chinese countryside from 1978, following the greater 
reliance on markets and smaller and more varied forms of enterprise, tells a powerful story, 
despite the wider framework of the Leninist state and the continuing, if diminished, role of 
central planning. In China, the failure of growth over the past year is substantially the result 
of the reforms not having proceeded far enough, making a further, eloquent case against 
the old system. 
South Korea and Taiwan have powerful states, supported by military establishments that 
absorb high proportions of their national output. They have been linked intimately into 
international markets for industrial products, increasingly so in the process of rapid growth. 
State enterprises have played major roles in investment, especially in Taiwan. Attempts at 
strategic intervention in corporate decision-making have been important, especially in 
Korea. 
What general conclusions can we draw from this kaleidoscope of East Asian experience? 
The first conclusion is that not much can be said simply about an overall effect of 
government intervention on economic development. It depends on the nature of the 
intervention and of the society and polity within which it operates. 
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IDEOLOGY AND MARKET-CONFORMING BEHAVIOUR 
/ 
The experience of East Asia underlines the old truth from the economic classics that the 
provision of the institutions of the market itself represent the irreducible minimum of state 
intervention for economic growth to proceed. 
Adam Smith was much more aware than later economists who promoted the virtues of his 
"invisible hand", of the political, moral and ideological basis of the market economy. 
Individuals have incentives to break the rules that are necessary to make a market economy 
work - to corrupt the legal basis of market exchanges, to collude in anti-competitive ways, to 
misrepresent the nature of assets which are the subject of contracts. Enforcement costs of 
market-conforming behaviour are extremely high unless the operators of the state, and 
powerful participants in markets, operate within an ideology that values market-conforming 
behaviour as a virtue, or which at least values the national benefits to economic 
development that flow from the honest and effective operation of markets. As we know from 
the failed development experience of many countries, these costs can be prohibitively high 
in a society in which there is no ideological basis for national development or acceptance of 
market rules. 
There are significant insights into these relationships in earlier theories linking the rise of 
capitalism in the West to the pre-capitalist ideologies of Europe, and contemporary theories 
linking East Asian success to a Confucian moral legacy. This is not the singular, ethno-
centric and, for the rest of humanity, depressing conclusion that success in economic 
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development is possible only when it is built, in the old case, on North Atlantic 
Protestantism, or in the modern cases on Neo-confucian ideology. Rather, the lessons are 
about the types of constraints on personal and social behaviour that are favourable for 
economic growth, whatever their particular cosmogenic justifications. 
Hirsch has observed that the declining moral legacy of the West has created problems for 
successful continuation of capitalist development. The weakening ideological support for 
self-restraint in maintaining the rules of the market place has required more explicit, 
extensive and expensive enforcement of the rules by a strong state. These observations 
take us back to Adam Smith in his historical setting. "Laissez faire" did not then represent 
withdrawal of government. In the eighteenth century, "laissez faire, laissez passer" alluded 
partly to the demand for a strong central state to enforce freedom of movement and contract 
against the local powers of other interests. 
The effective operation of the "invisible hand" required a state strong enough to keep at bay 
the vested powers that would always be seeking to conspire against freedom of trade and 
the public interest. 
As more East Asian states found their ways into Jones' 'optimality zone' in which sustained 
growth becomes possible, more of the essential conditions of growth became apparent. 
Everywhere a strong state is required to enforce the rules and maintain the integrity of the 
institutions that are nenessary for the affective operation of markets. Within this context, 
markets must play an important role in allocating resources. Amongst much else, markets 
must facilitate close integration into international sources of goods, services, capital and 
technology. 
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The public good of an effective domestic market can be provided by a strong and wise state 
acting alone. But, as Rattigan and Carmichael have reminded Australians in their recent 
paper on Australia and the Gatt, modern economic development also requires access to an 
effective international market - an international public good. In the early decades of rapid, 
internationally oriented East Asian growth, this essential international public good was 
provided gratis by the leadership of a self-confident and expansive United States of 
America. United States' commitment to keeping its own markets open, and to enforcing the 
rules and liberalising potential of the General Agreement for Tariffs and Trade, underpinned 
rapid expansion of international trade under clear and stable rules. However, in the 1980s, 
for a number of reasons that I have discussed elsewhere, the United States polity has 
ceased to be willing to lead the international system alone. Effective contributions to 
maintaining the open international trading systems now must be part of the irreducible 
minimum role of the state in any significant trading economy. 
Everywhere in high-growth East Asia, except Hong Kong, the state has been active in the 
promotion of growth-oriented ideology. The state's definition and assertion of the national 
interest in economic growth, together with close interaction between political leaders and 
interest groups (although the latter less in Hong Kong and Singapore), have created a 
favourable environment for living by the rules of the market, accepting the inconvenience of 
structural change, and reducing business uncertainty by generating shared perspectives on 
the directions of structural change. 
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This has been the substantial content of Johnson's "development state". This role of the 
state sometimes encompasses "picking winners", but for the most part not backing them, 
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when assistance to a particular industry is assessed net of the industry's contributions to 
assistance elsewhere. The celebrated role of Miti in influencing resource allocation in 
Japan, much less important today than in the sixties at an earlier stage of economic 
development, was never so powerful that it constrained the strategies of corporations which 
thought they knew better. It should also be noted that the Japanese government, when it 
moved from the form guide to the betting ring, backed as many losers as winners. The 
losers were by no means confined to the notorious case of agriculture. 
The biggest temporary failures of growth in Korea, in the late 1970s, and in Singapore, in 
the mid-1980s, were associated with the largest postwar direct interventions of those 
governments respectively in the course of industrial investment and structure. In Korea and 
Singapore, however, governments quickly recognised mistakes and declined to send good 
money after bad. 
The encouragement of market-conforming structural change in East Asia, therefore, has 
sometimes encompassed picking winners, but more rarely backing them consistently with a 
net transfer of resources. Most importantly, with the important exceptions in agriculture, it 
has encompassed the prompt dumping of losers as industries have lost international 
competitiveness, whether or not they had once received official support. 
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GETTING THE PRICES RIGHT 
/ 
Rapid economic growth requires continuing far-reaching structural change in response to 
changes in economic opportunities at home and abroad. Beyond the earliest stages of 
economic development, it is impossible to achieve the required flexibility unless markets are 
used extensively to allocate goods, services and factors of production, and to set the prices 
which govern exchanges. 
Price distortions in goods, services and factor markets powerfully influence growth 
performance. Statistical analyses reported by the World Bank indicated that over one-half 
of variations in growth performance amongst developing countries was explained by 
differences in the degree of price distortion in markets. The distortions related to exchange 
rates, the degree of protection in manufacturing industry, the degree of protection in 
agriculture, the rate of inflation, and to interest rates and electricity pricing. The East Asian 
economies which have sustained high growth have relatively low degrees of price distortion. 
As the World Bank would put it, to a considerable extent, they have "got their prices right". 
The evidence shows that the most important prices to get right are those governing 
incentives for production for export, relative to production for home markets. All of the East 
Asian economies in their periods of high growth have had high and increasing international 
orientation in their manufacturing sectors. Hong Kong, and Singapore have achieved this 
with fmft trarift. Knrpa and Taiwan aarly in their rapid industrialisation, and China today. 
have achieved this outcome with assistance to exports to offset the assistance to imports 
provided by protection. In a few instances, there has been over-compensation in favour of 
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export production, although as Rodan has demonstrated in the case of Singapore, this has 
not converted easily into upgrading the value of manufacturing production in the process of 
growth. 
Krueger, amongst others, has observed that movement towards internationally-oriented 
trade policies has contributed more to growth than standard economic analysis would 
suggest. 
We will return to this important phenomenon in our later discussion of Australian policy. 
Significantly, all of the rapidly expanding East Asian economies which had earlier relied on 
balancing protection with export incentives have found it expedient to move towards open 
regimes, without distortion on the export or the import side, as productivity and incomes 
have risen towards the range of advanced industrial economies. 
Open foreign exchange policies and regimes have been important to getting the foreign 
trade prices right. This has required convertible currencies at exchange rates that do not 
generate black markets, and liberal rules on access to foreign exchange. China continues 
to run a controlled and distorted foreign exchange regime and this has been an important 
source of economic instability and underperformance. 
It seems that economic development becomes increasingly demanding over time of 
flexibility, free communications and openness to ideas and technologies from the 
international economy, all of which depend on extensive use of effective markets with 
correct prices. Within a single country, growth has been able to proceed for a while within 
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rigid and internationally closed structures, as in China in the first decade of communism, or 
in North Korea for a bit longer. But growth under these circumstances peters into 
stagnation and eventually political and economic instability. Changes in the structure of the 
world economy have made it increasingly difficult for one country to succeed without 
intimate integration through markets with others. These factors represent Krueger's 
"shifting bottleneck", in which liberalisation of economic institutions is required to go further 
and further over time if growth is to be sustained. 
THE SIZE OF THE PUBLIC SECTOR 
The extent of government involvement in the economy is sometimes measured by the share 
of national output provided directly to the community through government administrative 
structures, or sold through state-owned enterprises. 
Direct spending on administrative and other non-commercial services has tended to be 
relatively low in East Asian economies experiencing rapid growth, and this has been 
associated with relatively low taxation shares of national income. If there is a general 
conclusion to be drawn, it is along the lines that smaller public sectors are associated with 
stronger growth. But there are exceptions and ambiguities which blur the messages. 
Certainly the high-growth economies have not skimped in provision of public education or 
economic infrastructure, although the efficiency with which the latter is provided has been 
onhancod in sovoral casos by potential and realised competition from private investors. In 
the more advanced economies in recent years, there has been a strong trend towards sale 
of infrastructure into the private sector. 
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The role of state-owned commercial enterprises has varied through East Asia - being 
prominent in Singapore and Taiwan, and relatively unimportant in Hong Kong and (in recent 
/ 
decades) Japan. The key to successful performance of state-owned enterprises has been 
the high quality of recruitment into public enterprises, and the establishment of a strong 
commercial orientation, often with competition from other enterprises, and with high 
expectations of commercial performance. 
THE STATE AND INCOME DISTRIBUTION 
Rapid economic growth in East Asia has been associated with relatively equitable 
distribution of income. This has been important to maintaining political support for and 
social cohesion around high growth, in the face of massive strains associated with structural 
change and associated churning of the relative political and economic standing of various 
groups in society. 
Historically, tough action by a strong state, sometimes externally imposed, was important to 
establishing the conditions for equitable income distribution: the Japanese-administered 
reform of feudal land ownership in Korea and Taiwan in colonial times; the Chinese land 
reforms after the communist victory on the mainland; the imposition of land, education and 
taxation reforms by the American occupying forces in Japan; and the far-reaching reforms 
of a wiser and (locally) stronger Kuomintang in Taiwan after its retreat from the mainland. 
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Everywhere in rapidly growing East Asia, a large, hard, competitive public education system 
provides relatively open access for high talent to elite positions. This has contributed to 
/ 
perceptions of equality of opportunity, as well as directly to growth performance. 
In the densely populated economies of East Asia, the equitable distribution of incomes and 
wealth, and the associated social cohesion around growth-oriented policies, has been 
challenged by the disproportionate increase in property values, especially urban real estate 
prices as incomes increased. High levels of public investment in housing has been one 
important response. This has been supported in Hong Kong and especially Singapore by 
forthright use of the power of the state to control the use of land, with compensation 
sometimes at levels that would be seen as confiscatory and unacceptable in our own 
society. 
GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION IN AUSTRALIA 
The experience of East Asia does nothing to contradict the older lessons from the economic 
texts and from our own experience. 
It underlines the importance of getting the prices right, and especially of avoiding 
government intervention through protection to raise incentives for domestic production over 
exports. It urges a firm approach to maintaining structural flexibility and to being prepared 
to accept the decline of industries which lose competitiveness in the process of economic 
growth. 
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It reminds us of the importance of macro-economic stability in general and price stability in 
particular. It urges that care be taken to provide a competitive economic infrastructure and 
to invest heavily in hard, formal education. It does not make a strong case against state-
owned enterprise, but it tells us that any state-owned enterprises should operate in a 
thoroughly commercial and competitive environment, with high expectations of financial 
performance. 
In the remaining part of the lecture, I will focus on one important set of government 
interventions in economic activity, which have been the subject of much public discussion 
and some contention following the release of the Garnaut Report. These are issues relating 
to "getting the prices right" or, in nomenclature used more often in Australia, to "levelling the 
playing field". 
"Getting the prices right" is not the same as minimising the role of government, let alone 
weakening the state. 
The improvement of Australian economic performance requires strong state action to 
enforce honest practices in commercial law, to reduce inflation and with it interest rates and 
the real exchange rate, to provide a competitive economic infrastructure, and to increase 
the flow of resources to the education and training of Australians for productive roles in an 
advanced economy. We need an active and effective state to secure access for Australia's 
most productive industries to expanding international markets. We need a strong state to 
build political support for reform, and to resist vested interests' requests for special favours. 
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None of this will be possible politically without the efficient delivery of social security to poor 
Australians, and without the integration of environmental and other objects into economic 
perspectives. 
This is a big and demanding agenda of state action. 
There is some doubt as to whether the Australian state is strong enough for the task. 
Australian governance is constrained constitutionally by short parliaments, the veto powers 
of a permanent opposition majority in the senate, and the diffusion of sovereignty through 
the federation. It is constrained politically by the Australian tradition of openness to 
pressure from sectional and vested interests. It would be impossible for the constrained 
Australian state to implement the radical reform programs of the Thatcher government in 
Britain at the height of its zeal, or of the Lange-Douglas government in New Zealand. There 
is good and bad in the constraints on state initiative in Australia. But, on balance, I would 
see advantages in the strengthening of Australian governments, at least through the 
lengthening of parliaments and the building of more co-operative federalism along the lines 
proposed recently by the Prime Minister. 
Australia and the Northeast Asian Ascendancy argued for greater international orientation of 
the Australian economy in this wider context of a strong, focussed, and effective state. It 
noted the progress that had been made through the 1980s in foreign exchange 
liberalisation, reduction in protection and removal of other distortions in foreign trade in 
several commodities. It observed that the continuation of reduction in protection at the 
overall rate of the current program would achieve free trade by the end of the century for all 
commodities except textiles, clothing, and footwear. It recommended the removal of all 
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protection by the end of the century. Acceptance of this recommendation would cause 
Australian producers to see themselves as operating in a world market, like those in the 
/ 
small, high-wage economies of Europe. When a country's markets for industrial products 
are mainly outside its own borders, its leaders soon come to the view that it is appropriate to 
remove or to minimise anti-dumping arrangements as well. 
The recommendation on protection was one of many in a long Report. It captured the 
public imagination more than others, and diverted attention from other matters of high 
importance. At the risk of further diversion, I will take a few moments to explain the 
recommendation on protection in the light of the public discussion. 
The recommendation was not for sudden removal of Australia's remaining protection. 
Eleven years is not a short period for adjustment. Eleven years is longer than it took for the 
Japanese textiles industry to move from being the world's largest exporter to a net importer. 
It is twice the time that it took the Japanese aluminium industry to move from being the 
world's second largest producer, in the late 1970s, to barely being a producer at all. It is 
over twice as long as it took over half a billion Chinese farmers to replace the people's 
communes with a system based on household responsibility, and longer than it took them to 
double their production. Ten years is the time that Singapore has given itself to move from 
the top ranks of developing countries to a standard of living equal to Switzerland, at the top 
of the European tree. 
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Reduction in protection would not proceed in isolation, but in the context of a range of 
reforms to reduce production costs in Australia. The removal of inflation would contribute to 
lower capital costs and a lower and more stable real exchange rate. The ending of inflation 
would also remove the taxation bias against long-lived capital-intensive investment. Cost 
reduction in transport, communications, and electricity generation, including through 
potential private competition for public enterprises, would improve the competitiveness of 
Australian production. An effective economic diplomacy would secure the continuation of 
the recent expansion of foreign markets for our most productive industries. Realistic, 
soundly based and stable rules for environmental approval would remove uncertainty which 
in recent years has been an important impediment to expansion of raw material processing. 
The wider context of the report encompassed strengthening of the Australian skills base 
through education and training, and a stronger economic focus in the immigration program. 
Each individual industry would gain directly, and indirectly through lower costs of living and 
therefore wage levels, from the reduction of protection for other industries. Each industry 
would be spared the deadweight cost of representations to government, public affairs 
departments and Canberra offices and lobbyists, that must be met for each to get its share 
in a protectionist polity. 
Within the Australian economy that would emerge from this approach, those Australian 
industries that export profitably in current circumstances would do much better. Any 
industry that is within striking distance of international competitiveness at present - any 
industry which now survives with low protection - would have its costs reduced enough to 
compete with foreign producers for the Australian market. 
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The most productive parts of Australian industry would expand into export markets. Some 
but not all of these parts would then enjoy lower costs from larger-scale production, and be 
provided with opportunities for further expansion. 
This is not abstract theory. The potential for operating competitively in an international 
environment, if artificial, cost-increasing restrictions were removed, can be confirmed by 
talking to many Australian producers, carrying a bewildering array of unnecessary 
Australian costs on their backs as they battle, and sometimes win, in international markets. 
Australia has hitherto been excluded from the expansion of intra-industry trade based on 
fine specialisation that was a principal source of North Atlantic growth from the 1960s and 
East Asian from the mid-1980s. It has been excluded mainly by the high costs imposed on 
trade at the border by protection and international transport costs. With the shift of the 
world's industrial centre of gravity towards our region, we can expect the removal of artificial 
border costs to be reflected in opportunities to join the fine economic specialisation that 
characterises the modern industrial world. 
The international including East Asian experience with trade liberalisation tells us that the 
greatest gains come from the way it causes every enterprise to know that it has to compete 
in an open international environment. This makes the enterprise sensitive to developments 
elsewhere in technology, management and market trends, and encourages rapid adaptation 
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to change. Firms know that to survive they must adopt the world's best practices, and so 
take care to inform themselves on and compare themselves with the world's best practices. 
/ 
Workers quickly learn the realities and make similar adjustments. 
For all of these reasons, those Australian industries which have been operating in an open, 
competitive, environment - for example our pastoral and mining industries, some mineral 
processing, and banking since deregulation - operate at the frontiers of world performance 
levels. Our protected manufacturing and service industries operate a long way from these 
frontiers. 
My recommendations have been contrasted in public discussion with the Australian 
Manufacturing Council (AMC) Report, The Global Challenge: Australian Manufacturing in 
the 1990s, that was presented to government and released in July this year. 
The contrast has been overdone - partly because the AMC Report itself highlighted 
differences on protection. The AMC programme overlaps with the earlier recommendations 
of my Report in many important areas: the need to expose Australian industry to 
international competitive pressure through further reductions in protection; the need to 
integrate the Australian economy more closely into economic opportunities in Asia; the need 
to invest more heavily in relevant education and training; the need to commit Australians to 
world class work practices and productivity performance; the need to reduce the cost of 
capital by reducing inflation; the need to remove cost-raising inefficiencies in transport and 
energy infrastructure and the need for stream-lining and settling policies and procedures on 
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environmental approvals for resource processing. The two Reports therefore embody a 
large agreed agenda for reform to improve the competitiveness of Australian industry. 
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But the differences remain important. The AMC proposals - implicit in the econometric 
analysis embodied in the report but not explicit in the report itself - have tariff protection 
falling to a maximum of 10 per cent by the end of the century for all industries except 
passenger motor vehicles, which would be protected at 25 per cent. 
In addition, suppliers of a small number of products from "global" industries would be 
required to sponsor some production in Australia under "offset" agreements: computers, 
telecommunications equipment and aerospace hardware, but not pharmaceuticals. The 
AMC Report would retain indefinitely anti-dumping arrangements, research and 
development taxation concessions and old and new export subsidies. Large-scale resource 
processing export projects would qualify for accelerated depreciation of capital expenditure 
for taxation purposes. 
The AMC Report has emerged from a consensus process involving a number of large 
manufacturing unions and producers. It represents a substantial step towards commitment 
to international standards of performance within the sector. It supports the virtual removal 
of Australia's most costly and damaging protection, for textiles, clothing and footwear. From 
these perspectives, it is to be welcomed. 
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The AMC Report eloquently describes the damage to Australia of past protection, including 
the legacy of an inward-looking and uncompetitive manufacturing sector. But it argues that 
Australia would benefit more from partial removal of protection than from moving all the way 
to "getting the prices right". 
The AMC Report presents the results of some economic modelling, purportedly to 
demonstrate the superiority of "nearly getting the prices right" over a policy of removing all 
protection by the end of the century. Only the results derived from the Orani model need to 
be taken seriously. These results are presented in a manner which, to say it gently, is not 
very honest. 
The Orani model only measures the gains from reallocating resources from protected 
industries to other industries operating at their current productivity levels - the gains 
commonly described as "static" by economists. In the exercise for the AMC, it does not 
bring to account economies of scale from greater specialisation. It excludes the spurs to 
world class management, technological and marketing performance that both the AMC and 
Garnaut Reports argue are the main sources of gains from trade liberalisation. 
The Orani exercise suggests that the AMC proposals yield the greater part of the static 
gains that could be obtained from removal of all protection, for the good reason that the 
proposals encompass the removal of the greater part of protection. The AMC Report says 
that the difference in the static gains from its own and my position is zero, although the 
working sheets from the modelling exercise demonstrate the difference to be about one 
billion dollars per annum in today's prices. 
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The AMC Report excludes the dynamic benefits from trade liberalisation, but includes these 
same benefits as part of the very large gains that would be obtained from moving towards 
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world class work practices and productivity. 
But even the Orani model's static gains from removing the last protection from cars and 
other items, beyond the AMC recommendations, are far from negligible. There are not 
many single micro-economic reforms that can yield the Australian economy one billion 
dollars per annum. 
There is a more fundamental problem in the political economy of the AMC position. Shann 
observed sixty years ago that a protectionist polity's work is never done. The protectionist 
polity is forever busy with the representations on this or that new special case. If Australia 
removes almost all assistance measures, but leaves car producers with half a billion dollars 
per annum in assistance from protection, and raw material processors with several billion 
dollars per annum in unique tax concessions, why would we expect the political economy of 
the rent seeking society to stop to draw its breath? Every other industry would pay for 
motor vehicle protection in its cost of labour and materials, and for processing assistance in 
higher interest rates and inflation. Some of the other industries which would carry the costs 
would be battling in international markets, or at home without protection. How to explain to 
the farmer shooting sheep at Katanning, or to the Perth exporter of solar heaters, that he or 
she has no similar case for assistance? Certainly the AMC does not make the case for the 
difference in terms of external benefits to the wider Australian economy.  
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If we keep the Australian polity busy with the political economy of industry assistance, we 
will lack the energy and time to right the other wrongs of the Australian economy. There will 
be less effective pressure and less political capacity to remove inflation, to strengthen our 
education, training and economic infrastructure, and to reform the legal basis of our 
securities and financial markets. 
Economics has a theory of the second best, in which the impossibility of removing one 
distortion may justify the retention of others. Hence my own Report envisaged retention of 
the existing structure of export subsidies, to compensate exporters, albeit imperfectly, for 
the cost of protection pending its removal. It contemplated the case for comprehensive 
indexation of the taxation system in recognition of the inflation-induced bias against long-
lived capital intensive investments. It rejected the latter because of its administrative costs, 
and its inferiority in these and other respects to a committed effort to remove inflation. 
Australia's history teaches us that the second best is often not good enough. 
CONCLUSIONS 
My Report was cautious in the lessons for Australia that it drew from the Northeast Asian 
economic success. The Northeast Asian experience varies a great deal from country to 
country and, in any case, as we have seen, the historical and institutional environment has 
a large effect on what will work and what will fail. Australia has its own history, institutions, 
values and hopes. 
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The assertions by others that the East Asian experience provides compelling evidence for 
us to move in certain ways drew me to this evening's subject, linking the East Asian lessons 
about markets and the state with contemporary Australian discussion of trade and industry 
policy. 
The East Asian economic success has transformed the world economy and our own 
economic choices. It has not forced the transformation of our understanding of the 
important relationships in economics and economic history. 
Our survey of the East Asian story has not given us new reasons to demand a larger and 
more important role for the state in economic development. Neither has it provided a new 
confirmation that a libertarian reality shapes the choices of humanity. It has, however, 
brought into sharper focus some of the ways in which an effective state and the power of 
the market must work together. 
Australia will be the richer if all sides of politics claim as their own the simple truths that 
come from the systematic study of economics and history, including in East Asia. This will 
build in all of us, amongst other things, a regard for the strength of the state in its core 
activities, and wariness about any restriction of trade and rigging of prices to benefit one 
group of producers over others. 
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Agreement on these basic truths would liberate our political society to focus on and to 
achieve the things that a strong state must do well for a nation to prosper. We could then 
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save our disagreements for those other great issues, on which it is possible for wise 
Australians to hold difference opinions, because they believe different things about what is 
good. 
For all of these reasons, I have been glad this evening to honour the work of Professor 
Shann at the University of Western Australia. 
